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ABSTRACT
Actuarial risk assessments might be unduly perceived as a neutral
way to counteract implicit bias and increase the fairness of deci-
sions made at almost every juncture of the criminal justice system,
from pretrial release to sentencing, parole and probation. In recent
times these assessments have come under increased scrutiny, as
critics claim that the statistical techniques underlying them might
reproduce existing patterns of discrimination and historical biases
that are reflected in the data.Much of this debate is centered around
competing notions of fairness and predictive accuracy, resting on
the contested use of variables that act as “proxies” for characteris-
tics legally protected against discrimination, such as race and gen-
der.
We argue that a core ethical debate surrounding the use of re-
gression in risk assessments is not simply one of bias or accuracy.
Rather, it’s one of purpose. If machine learning is operationalized
merely in the service of predicting individual future crime, then it
becomes difficult to break cycles of criminalization that are driven
by the iatrogenic effects of the criminal justice system itself. We
posit that machine learning should not be used for prediction, but
rather to surface covariates that are fed into a causal model for
understanding the social, structural and psychological drivers of
crime. We propose an alternative application of machine learning
and causal inference away from predicting risk scores to risk miti-
gation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a team of investigative journalists from ProPublica pub-
lished an article [4] claiming that COMPAS, a proprietary risk as-
sessment tool that has been used in the U.S. criminal justice system,
was racially biased. The article sparked a national debate about the
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expanding use of algorithmic decision-making aids in the courts.
This debate is emblematic of a much broader conversation around
the appropriate use of data and statistical methods in society, in
spheres as varied as health care, housing, employment and edu-
cation. For example, Selbst [60] cites media debates on consumer
finance [21], employment [70], housing [11], health care [63], and
sentencing [67]. While these issues are largely framed in terms of
new technology, driven by “big data” or “artificial intelligence,” the
methods and tools in question are often incremental iterations on
much older actuarial decision-making practices. This is certainly
the case for risk assessments, which have existed in some form in
the U.S. criminal justice system since the 1920’s.
By placing the current debate around risk assessment in a broader
context, we can get a fuller understanding of the way these actuar-
ial tools have evolved to achieve a varied set of social and institu-
tional agendas. The current debate around risk assessment tends
to characterize or implicitly concede the purpose of these tools as
fundamentally predictive in nature. The more significant power of
data-driven risk assessment can be as a broader diagnostic tool, one
used to help practitioners address risk as a dynamic, intervenable
phenomenon. When risk assessments are recast in this light, we
can ask whether or not regression and machine learning methods
can help in diagnosis and intervention, rather than prediction. We
make a case for why causal inference, a statistical method designed
explicitly to establish a causal connection between a “treatment”
and an outcome of interest, provides a more desirable framework
for developing intervention-driven risk assessments in the crimi-
nal justice system.
2 CURRENT DEBATES ON THE FAIRNESS OF
RISK ASSESSMENTS
Risk assessment tools have been adopted to assist with a number of
decision points throughout the criminal justice system, from pre-
trial release to post-conviction sentencing, probation and parole. In
spite of the tools’ growing influence over judicial or administrative
decisions, defendants rarely have an opportunity to probe or chal-
lenge the recommendations the tools generate. While defendants
are suppliedwith their end scores, they are typically not entitled to
access the calculations or input data that were used to calculate the
final tabulation. Critics have called for increased transparency sur-
rounding the development and administration of these tools, argu-
ing that the proprietary interests of assessment developers should
not take precedence over a defendant’s right to due process in the
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courts [4, 25, 72]. In addition to transparency issues related to pro-
prietary software, a major focus of recent scholarship has been on
developing interpretable machine learning models that enable out-
side researchers to better scrutinize the underlying logic of actuar-
ial tools which are based on machine learning [69, 73].
Others have focused on the particular ethical challenges that
arise during the administration and interpretation of risk assess-
ments. Although risk assessments can be perceived – and some-
times marketed – as an objective means of overcoming human
bias in decision making, there remain many ways that human dis-
cretion enters into the formation and interpretation of risk scores.
Ethnographic work has shown that scores are frequently misap-
plied and misinterpreted by judges and practitioners [37].
Moreover, scholars have documented specific strategies that ad-
ministrators can use to shade or manipulate end scores to reflect
their preconceptions of offender risk [37, 40]. There have also been
multiple documented instances in which a risk or needs score has
been inappropriately referenced for a decision it was not intended
to inform (for example, a needs score that was intended to inform
probation decisions being cited in judges’ sentencing statements)
[4, 72]. At least one recent court ruling has emphasized the impor-
tance of providing judges additional information about the limita-
tions inherent in risk score predictions [57]. Others have called for
more work to be done in order to understand how risk scores inter-
act with the pre-existing biases and beliefs of the individuals who
rely on them [25].
Amidst all these issues, arguably the primary focus of debate
regarding the fairness of risk assessments has centered around the
specific methods and data used to develop statistically valid predic-
tions. Risk assessment is commonly characterized as a predictive
technology, one whose value is measured by the degree to which
they are more accurate than the fallible human decision makers
they are designed to advise or supplant [46]. This characterization
stems in part from the fact that much of the recent attention on risk
assessments has centered around their appropriate use in pretrial
release decisions [4, 26, 46].
In contrast to other stages of the criminal justice process, pre-
trial release is framed as a narrow and fundamentally predictive
task: risk assessments are used to inform decisions about whom to
detain and whom to release before a trial date. Increasingly, pre-
trial risk assessments are being embraced as part of a larger effort
to move away from a “resource-based” approach of making release
decisions, based on individuals’ ability to post cash bail, to a “risk-
based” approach that centers on predicting one’s likelihood of en-
gaging in a specific set of undesirable behaviors, such as failure to
appear in court or to engage in new criminal activity [27, 43].
In this context, some scholars have framed the value-add of
risk assessment strictly in terms of their ability to make predic-
tions more accurately than the judges meting out such decisions
by themselves [46]. Because the value-add of risk assessments has
been framed largely in terms of their predictive power, much of
the ethical debate surrounding them has focused on how to han-
dle various forms of bias in the face of less-than-accurate tools.
Scholars have identified numerous ways that statistically-driven
methods like machine learning can reproduce existing patterns of
individual prejudice and institutionalized bias. These mechanisms
correspond with different stages in the model design process such
as identifying the research question, collecting training data, label-
ing examples within the training set, feature selection and double-
encoding bias in proxies for protected classes [4, 7, 13, 29, 65].
Others have focused specifically on bias inmodel outcomes. Crit-
ics of risk assessment have expressed concerns about the distribu-
tion of inter-group inaccuracy in risk models. They emphasize the
importance of predictive parity as an explicit goal; that is, the sys-
temswe use should not only be equally accurate, but also have sim-
ilar accuracy rates over all test groups (e.g. different racial groups
or genders) to which they are applied. These researchers have ar-
gued that risk assessments are not that accurate to begin with, and
for the large percentage of outcomes that is not accurate, disparate
impact tends to fall disproportionately across the population, along
racial lines [4, 13].
Yet proponents of risk assessment have argued that uneven dis-
tributions of false positives and false negatives do not constitute
a “biased” model in a strictly technical sense. These individuals
contend that the most important consideration regarding bias is
whether or not the probability estimates provided by the algorithm
are well-calibrated, so that the algorithm performs in a way that is
equally accurate across all groups [26, 64]
This debate has led to a broader discussion on the inherent trade-
offs in these competing notions of fairness. Kleinberg et al. [48]
argue that, in general, no mechanism can both achieve optimal ac-
curacy, and optimal predictive parity, unless the base rates for the
groups are equal, or the algorithm in fact achieves perfect classi-
fication. In their excellent survey Berk. et al: identify six kinds of
fairness, and show that not only these notions conflict with accu-
racy, but also with one another [10].
This debate is now evolving to identify specific trade-offs be-
tween things like predictive accuracy and predictive parity across
groups. This makes sense when we frame the value of risk assess-
ments strictly in terms of their utility as a predictive technology,
whereby accuracy levels are often in direct tension with these com-
peting notions of fairness. However, this framing of the issues es-
chews the fact that risk assessments are rarely used just for predic-
tive purposes. The majority of risk assessments in use today are
based on a “risk-needs-responsivity” framework to inform a broad
range of decisions regarding effective punishment and treatment
[34]. Such assessments are, and should be, fundamentally diagnos-
tic in nature, whereby risk is conceptualized as a dynamic phenom-
enon that can be lowered through a range of semi-personalized
interventions.
In the criminal justice system, risk assessments play an integral
role in shaping how practitioners understand and intervene in the
lives of offenders in the service of lowering future crime rates. We
conceptualize risk assessments as part of an assemblage of prac-
tices and tools that give rise to visibilities, or ways of viewing, in-
dividual offenders and complex phenomena like criminal behavior
[40]. Risk assessments have evolved over the last several decades to
support a diverse set of institutional goals and processes. In the fol-
lowing section, we give a brief overview of how risk assessments
have evolved from a tool used solely for prediction to one that is
diagnostic at its core. We then call into questionwhether or not the
statistical methods currently underlying risk assessments, namely
regression and, to a limited extent, machine learning, are the ap-
propriate methods to use in the service of this goal.
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3 RISK ASSESSMENTS: PREDICTIVE OR
DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS?
The evolution of actuarial risk assessment has beenwell documented
by others, and is frequently broken down into four generations of
tools [3, 17, 36, 39, 53]. The first generation of risk assessments
emerged in the 1920’s and were based largely on semi-structured
clinical evaluations that were carried out by skilled professionals
as part of an effort to identify rehabilitative treatment options for
offenders. These assessments were structured around a standard-
ized set of clinical items, but did not include a statisticalmechanism
for validating scores and decisions [3].
First generation risk assessment tools fell out of fashion in the
1970’s, as they were widely criticized for being too subjective and
having low levels of predictive accuracy [36]. Also during this time,
a “nothing works” mindset began to supplant the rehabilitative ap-
proach that had dominated the correctional system during the first
half of the twentieth century [51]. In place of treatment programs,
approaches based on incapacitation and other “law and order”mea-
sures became the norm.
A second generation of assessment was optimized and validated
for predictive accuracy using a new statistical method: regression
modeling. Regressionmodeling is particularlywell-suited for prediction-
oriented assessment, because it enables researchers to identify vari-
ables that are predictive of an outcome of interest, without nec-
essarily having to understand why that factor is significant. To
this end, the second generation of assessment focused almost ex-
clusively on static historical factors, such as age and criminal his-
tory. Such factors were considered desirable because theywere per-
ceived as both objective and highly predictive [51]. This marked a
subtle shift in the values and goals risk assessments were designed
to support, away from semi-personalized treatment and towards
objective prediction. As a result, risk assessments were reconfig-
ured as a more simplistic tool that relied heavily on prior criminal
history to predict future outcomes.
These changes marked a significant shift in the way the justice
system understood and responded to the notion of offender risk.
While earlier tools were designed to facilitate effective treatment,
new statistical assessments were based on a static notion of risk,
one that was not easily changed through intervention. These as-
sessments gave rise to what some scholars have dubbed a “new
penology,” whereby penal policies shifted away from rehabilita-
tive interventions to more administrative approaches to popula-
tion management that rely almost exclusively on incapacitation to
mitigate risk [24]. As Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat argue, when
assessments pivot towards prediction, rather than intervention, “risk
is conceived of as a negative strategy that incapacitates and man-
ages but never produces productive transformations” [51]. Since
the 1970s, the shift towards standardized decision-making and away
from individualized treatment accompanied a sharp increase in in-
carceration rates [38].
These prediction-oriented risk assessments were a part of a suite
of tools and policies introduced in the 1970’s and 80’s that relied
heavily on prior criminal history to predict and systematize in-
terventions to prevent future crime. Other policies included state
and federal sentencing guidelines, which were ostensibly designed
to standardize decision making across jurisdictions and minimize
bias in sentencing. A growing body of scholarship has linked these
“colorblind” policies to trends in mass incarceration and growing
racial disparities in the criminal justice system. [33, 39, 59, 68].
Scholars have argued that prediction-oriented risk assessments
produce a “ratchet effect” on profiled populations, because they
fail to take into consideration the criminogenic nature of the crim-
inal justice system itself [33, 39]. Studies have demonstrated dimin-
ishing returns on the use of incarceration as a means of lowering
crime [74]. In fact, the ripple effects of incarceration, such as the
weakening of family ties and diminishing employment opportuni-
ties, can exacerbate the likelihood of future recidivism at both the
individual and collective level [15, 16, 52]. As Hamilton has argued,
assessments that rely on a static, prediction-oriented notion of risk
can act as a “self-fulfilling prophecy” that justifies and widens the
net of social control over marginalized populations [33].When risk
is constituted as a static phenomenon, it can only suggest what
should not be done (i.e. release), and gives little insight into what
can be done to improve outcomes [8].
By the 1980’s, critiques of this prediction-oriented approach started
to emerge, heralding in the next iteration of assessment. Propo-
nents of evidence-based justice reform argued that risk assessment
should be reconfigured to help in the effort of reducing the risk
of recidivism and lowering incarceration rates. Risk assessments
were reframed as a way of effectively identifying and allotting
scarce resources to programs and interventions that were “proven”
to work [1, 2, 14, 23],
To this end, a third generation of actuarial tools integrated fac-
tors that were conceived as “criminogenic needs,” or intervenable
factors that are believed to impact one’s risk of recidivating. These
included a more diverse set of inputs, such as employment sta-
tus and history of substance abuse, which effectively reconstituted
risk as a dynamic phenomenon that could be intervened upon [3].
While many of these dynamic factors held less predictive power
than the static attributes included on second generation tools, these
needs factors were desirable because they enabled criminal justice
practitioners to consider a broader set of treatment options aimed
at lowering risk.
Thus, predictive risk and intervenable needs factors were com-
bined into a hybrid risk/needs model, one that used regression to
identify statistically significant risk/needs factors. The key differ-
ence between second and third generation assessments, then, was
the incorporation of these less predictive, but dynamic, risk/needs
factors that could inform the selection of treatment interventions
beyond incapacitation. By the 1990’s, these efforts were further
supplemented by fourth generation tools that added “responsivity
factors,” such as levels of intelligence, self-esteem, and psychologi-
cal disorders, in order to improve response outcomes to treatment
[1]. The risk-needs-responsivity (RNR) framework has reasserted
the authority of a correctional treatment approach, one that envi-
sions offenders as individuals capable of reform through interven-
tion.
Today risk assessments are used for two primary purposes,which
Monahan and Skeem deem “prediction-oriented” and “reduction-
oriented” approaches to assessment [53]. Prediction-oriented as-
sessments are used to facilitate accurate and efficient prediction
of future recidivism, while reduction-oriented tools are intended
to inform treatment and supervision plans. In recent years, we’ve
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seen a resurgence of public interest in prediction-oriented assess-
ments, particularly at the pretrial stage where release decisions are
viewed as essentially a forecasting task. Yet we argue that even
pretrial decisions should be characterized as a moment of inter-
vention, rather than mere prediction. The push to adopt pretrial
assessments, like the Public Safety Assessment, is tightly coupled
with efforts to eliminate cash bail, which empirical analysis has
demonstrated to be ineffective at lowering near-term risks (fail-
ure to appear and new criminal activity) and long-term recidivism
rates. For example, Gupta et.al show that high bail amounts, which
often result in pretrial detention, drive a rise in long-term recidi-
vism rates [32].
Bail is an ineffective pretrial intervention that proponents of
risk assessment would like to eliminate in the service of achiev-
ing better pretrial outcomes. When framed in this way, the logical
next question is not so much whether or not judges make more ac-
curate decisionswhen they use risk assessments. Rather, we should
be asking whether or not pretrial risk assessments effectively sup-
port judges in making better decisions about whom to release, and
under what conditions (i.e. how should the criminal justice system
intervene in an individual’s life to mitigate specific, relevant risks).
Thus, we argue that the most socially beneficial use of risk assess-
ments should be centered around their utility as a diagnostic tool,
at all stages of the criminal justice life cycle. This is an important
point because it informs the goals and characteristics we strive to
achieve in the development of a fair and ethical risk assessment
tool.
In recent times, there has been a growing enthusiasm around
the idea of using machine learning techniques to enhance the per-
formance ofmodern day assessments. However, thesemethods run
the risk of swinging the trend of assessment back towards predic-
tion, rather than intervention. New statistical techniques like ma-
chine learning have garnered a lot of enthusiasm and, as Kleinberg
et al. have pointed out, this increased enthusiasm and investment
might unduly push institutions to reframe their goals in a way that
is amenable to machine learning analysis [47].
Similar to regression, machine learning models are well-suited
to the task of identifying correlational relationships across an even
wider range of variables, with the goal being to create assessments
that can predict risk with greater accuracy. While earlier assess-
ments were based on theories in criminology, data mining enables
the surfacing of new patterns and trends that are “born from the
data,” without necessarily having a theoretical explanation for why
they emerge [45]. As such, machine learning is touted as a way of
helping us identify patterns that we could not have discovered by
ourselves, in the service of creating more predictive tools.
Yet, diagnostic practices do not map cleanly to tools that use
prediction-orientedmethods, such as regression andmachine learn-
ing. While the goals of risk assessment have expanded, the sta-
tistical methods used to identify risks and needs have remained
the same since their introduction in second generation tools. This
regression-based methodology is ill-suited for the purpose of effec-
tive diagnosis and intervention of criminogenic needs. When we
use regression for intervention, we run the risk of conflating cor-
relational variables with causal ones, which gives rise to a range
of challenges.
In the following section, we argue that assessments designed for
intervention require a different set of statistical techniques, ones
that can identify causal relationships between risk factors and fu-
ture crime. We outline key differences between regression, ma-
chine learning and causal inference in order to make the case for
moving away fromusing regression andmachine learning for intervention-
oriented assessment.
4 REGRESSION VS. MACHINE LEARNING VS.
CAUSAL INFERENCE
Nothwithstanding the popular discourse on the ethical use of risk
assessments, the vast majority of these tools do not use new sta-
tistical methods frequently associated with “artificial intelligence,”
such as machine learning. They are overwhelmingly based on re-
gression models. Moreover, the small number of tools that are cur-
rently being developed using machine learning methods should be
characterized as an incremental, rather than a transformational, in-
novation in the way risk assessments have historically worked.
Regression analysis is widely used for purposes of forecasting
future events. The main goal of regression is to identify a set of
variables that are predictive of a given outcome variable. This is
achieved by determining the optimal weights for a given set of
covariates, ones that are best predictive of the outcome variable of
interest. This is done through processes called model checking and
selection [28], whereby statistical tests are run on each covariate
to see how significantly predictive they are of the outcome vari-
able . Covariates that are identified through this process are cor-
relational, not causal, of the outcome variable. For example, prior
arrest has been found to be an important predictor of future crime
but does not shed light on the causal drivers of criminal behavior.
Regression based models, while better suited for predicting risk
scores, are not well-equipped to answer causal questions on inter-
ventional covariates. Tacking on interventional covariates to a list
of risk covariates and using regression models for risk prediction
suffers from three main drawbacks:
First, regressionmodels for risk prediction are blunt instruments
that do not always contextualize risk and intervenable factors spe-
cific to different subgroups in the data [30]. Critics have pointed
out that criminogenic needs in risk assessments are treated as “uni-
versal,” even though the theories and data on which they are vali-
dated often skew heavily towards a white, male population. Very
little attention has been given to validating these models on more
diverse populations, in spite of the fact that there is a robust body
of academic literature that captures a variety of gendered and racial-
ized pathways to crime [9, 12, 62]. This has significant implications
for how we understand the predictive and diagnostic potency of
risk assessment tools for diverse populations [56]. For example,
scholars have argued that covariates currently included in many
regression models for risk prediction are limited to a narrow set of
androcentric theories of criminogenic need, to the exclusion of risk
and interventional covariates specific to female defendants. The
decision of which covariates to add into the regression model is
largely driven by how accurate the model’s predictions are, not by
well-posed questions around how causal the covariates are, poten-
tially excluding covariates that are core drivers of criminal behav-
ior for different subgroups in the population. For example, some
Interventions over Predictions:
Reframing the Ethical Debate for Actuarial Risk Assessment FAT* 2018, February 2018, New York, NY USA
analyses of the LSI-R risk assessment tool have shown that the
covariates used for risk prediction are largely informed by a male
offender worldview, ignoring well-established “pathways to crime”
for women (i.e. childhood sexual abuse, substance addiction, and
lack of employment) as a crucial interventional class of covariates
specific to women [56].
Second, the set of factors considered in RNR assessments are
typically constrained to a narrow set of variables, ones which are
amenable to individualized treatment plans and are informed by
particular psychological and normative theories of re-offending
[35]. Very little consideration has been given to broader social or
structural drivers of crime. Indeed, influential scholars of some of
the most widely used risk assessments in use today have explic-
itly discounted the relevance of sociological factors, such as ethnic-
ity and socioeconomic status, because those factors are viewed as
static and challenging to intervene upon. These researchers claim
that it is a myth to think that the "roots of crime are buried deep in
structured inequality," arguing that psychological factors, such as
antisocial cognitive patterns and beliefs, have demonstrated much
stronger statistical significance when it comes to inter-individual
variations in re-arrest within the defendant population. [1, 55].
Yet, as Prins and Reich have pointed out, these scholars often
conflate "causes of crime" with "causes of individual differences in
crime." [55]. Such heavy emphasis on psycho-social factors may
limit our ability to understand the underlying drivers of criminal
activity at the population level, or ask harder questions about why
we see persistent disparities in crime and arrest rates across cer-
tain populations and geographies [55]. As Hannah-Moffat has ar-
gued, in RNR assessments an offender’s needs are stripped of their
broader social context, and are framed largely in terms of poor
choices or moral and psychological deficiencies that can be treated
through “re-education” at the individual level [35]. This approach
tends to obfuscate the significance of underlying factors that are
highly prevalent for the population of interest. As Prins and Reich
argue, if such structural factors are, "nearly ubiquitous for individu-
als who become involved in the criminal justice system, we would
not expect them to be predictive of inter-individual variation in
arrest" [55].
The narrow theoretical focus of risk assessments stems in part
from the fact that regression is ill-suited to test and differentiate
competing models of criminal behavior. This has led to a fairly
narrow conceptualization of criminogenic need that is limited to at-
tributes which demonstrate a statistically significant relationship
to future recidivism rates in a regression model. Other common
sense needs factors for which a statistically significant relation-
ship could not be established, such as mental health, have been
excluded from these models.
Within a regression framework, one might address this issue by
identifying competing theories of criminogenic behavior and run-
ning two different regression models to see which one is more pre-
dictive. But if two different regression modelswere estimated using
different guiding criminogenic theories for different subgroups in
the population, one has to contend with the real possibility of the
models arriving at different risk predictions, leaving no principled
way to choose the prediction of one model over another.
Finally, it is challenging to differentiate intermediate outcomes
from covariates in a regression based model sans a causal inference
framework [30]. This is important because without establishing a
causal relationship between a given covariate to the risk of recidi-
vism, we run the risk of misinterpreting an intermediate outcome
as a causal driver of crime. This is deeply significant if we are to
use risk assessments as the basis for identifying effective interven-
tions to address the underlying drivers of crime. Associative rela-
tionships between covariates used in a regression model and the
outcome variable of interest need not be causal; such covariates
might bemisconstrued as an intermediate outcome that is causal of
criminal behavior. Prins and Reich underline this important point
by means of a compelling example using a directed acyclic graph.
They show how intensive policing causes more re-arrests and anti
law-enforcement resentment (“antisocial cognition”) at the same
time. While antisocial cognition might strongly predict re-arrest,
it is not typically a causal driver of re-arrest. Intervening to tackle
antisocial cognition without addressing the root cause of exces-
sive and intensive policing will not reduce re-arrests under such a
model - antisocial cognition is itself caused by increased intensive
policing and must not be misinterpreted as a causal driver of crime.
It is important to distinguish machine learning from causal in-
ference. Machine learning leverages concepts of pattern recogni-
tion, prediction, abstraction and generalization, while a causal in-
ference framework is based on estimating the effect of an inter-
vention on a outcome variable of interest. Machine learning algo-
rithms leverage the same principles as regression for predicting an
outcome variable, but do so by expanding the set of covariates for
prediction. In machine learning, one wants to obtain a generalized
model that appropriately fits the data at hand. This is achieved in
machine learning using a variety of advanced statistical techniques
such as kernel transformations and parameter sweeping, which en-
able complex interactions between covariates to be captured (but
not necessarily understood) for the purposes of increased predic-
tive accuracy. In a sense, machine learning treats prediction as
sacrosanct – it is not important why a given set of covariates are
predictive, so long as they are.
Machine learning algorithms used for prediction of risk scores
should be seen as incremental extensions of regression-based meth-
ods, ones that will amplify, rather than mitigate, the challenges we
describe above. Though the vast majority of risk predictionmodels
are based on regression, there has been an increased interest in us-
ing contemporary “supervised” machine learning methods in this
setting. In supervised machine learning, a given set of covariates,
also referred to as features, are used in a model to predict the out-
come variable of interest. An analyst estimating a model to predict
risk scores has many types of algorithms to choose from. Many
of these algorithms use advanced statistical methods to transform
the space of input features into a higher order space that is often
difficult to interpret, even by the analyst estimating the model.
In a supervised machine learning driven prediction setting, the
principal focus is on achieving reliable and accurate prediction.
The question of what constitutes the input space of features is sec-
ondary to achieving the best predictions possible. Often a machine
learning engineer will simply add or remove individual features,
reestimate a newmodel with the changed feature spaces and check
for the predictive performance of the model [44]. There is often no
other rationale given for including and excluding individual fea-
tures. Similar to regression, the set of input features are merely
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correlational and not causal of the outcome variable. Recent work
on interpretable supervised learning algorithms for risk score pre-
diction in the criminal justice system attempts to explain the logic
used by the model in computing the risk for a new defendant, but
this should be seen as incremental to current practices, as it fails to
answer the question of which features are causal drivers of crimi-
nal behavior.
Furthermore, such a supervised setting, even with better model
interpretability [73], is not a principled way of determining how
much a given variable needs to change to reduce the risk of future
crime. For example, determining number of hours of cognitive be-
havioral therapy given to incarcerated individuals to address their
criminogenic psychopathology (a common intervenable variable)
is difficult to compute using these methods devoid a causal infer-
ence framework. In short, without a causal inference framework,
contemporary supervised learning algorithms used for risk predic-
tion are not useful for targeted intervention. The increased atten-
tion and excitement around machine learning and artificial intelli-
gence, coupled with the advanced statistical techniques they make
use of has given them the veneer of appearing “scientific,” accompa-
nied by descriptive language that often subtly connotes causality,
when in reality these models do not even broach causality.
5 TOWARDS A CAUSAL FRAMEWORK FOR
RISK ASSESSMENT
In contrast to regression and machine learning, statistical causal
inference [42] is a framework that is used to establish causal rela-
tionships between covariates and the outcome variable of interest.
This is achieved through the design of experimental conditions in
which covariates are altered systematically to see if the alteration
produces effect changes in the outcome variable. The key differ-
ence between causal inference and regression-like methods is the
ability for one to change values of a covariate for the purpose of ex-
amining whether it causes the outcome variable. Causal inference
is best suited for the design of interventions that reduce the risk of
future crime.
Yet regression, and to a limited extent predictive machine learn-
ing, dominate the landscape of risk assessments used for both pre-
diction and intervention. This gives rise to a series of challenges
that limit the justice’s systems ability to effectively intervene to
lower the risk of recidivism. A causal inference experiment pro-
duces new data to be analyzed for the purpose of establishing causal-
ity, but in regression and machine learning, one is limited to his-
torical data that has already been captured, potentially excluding
important variables crucial for effective intervention.
Unlike regression and predictive supervised machine learning
models, a causal inference framework is better suited to answer
questions of “what interventions work” in the criminal justice sys-
tem, particularly those aimed at decreasing well-specified risks,
such as recidivism and failure to appear in court. For example con-
sider the potential outcomes causal inference framework. In this
approach causality is inferred by randomly assigning individuals
or groups, referred to as units, to an intervention or treatment.
Each unit subjected to a treatment may realize an outcome of in-
terest, and upon receiving no treatment may realize an alternate
outcome, also known as the counter-factual. Randomly assigning
units to both the treatment and the control and comparing the po-
tential outcome after the application of treatment and control gives
a measure of the causal effect of the chosen intervention.
When performed under an experimental setting, this is known
as a randomized control trial (RCT) and is considered the gold stan-
dard for measuring the causal effects of a given treatment, under a
set of conditions for a defined unit [42]. For example, a randomized-
controlled trial in Philadelphia found that community-based low
intensity supervision program of low-risk offenders was more ef-
fective than high-intensity law-enforcement supervision in reduc-
ing new criminal activity of the offenders [6].
In the criminal justice system it may not always be possible to
practically obtain a potential outcome for both the treatment and
the control of the same unit. Beyond technical challenges with the
data, researchers may encounter resistance from the legal profes-
sion, which has been reticent to adopt rigorous empirical methods
to infer the effectiveness of interventions in the criminal justice
system. Greiner and Matthews [31] point to the fact that the first
RCT’s in the medical and legal fields were conducted around the
same time, in the early 1930s. Yet today, the legal field overwhelm-
ingly lags medical research in the use of scientific causal methods
to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions.
Causal inference in cases where it is not possible to do an RCT is
usually derived from applying the same concepts to observational
data, with donor pooling and other matching methods to fill the
counter-factual values for each unit based on identifying similar
units receiving the two different interventions [58]. For example, a
recent observational study evaluated the effectiveness of different
forms of electronic monitoring (EM) technologies for released de-
fendants in the state of Florida. Using propensity-score matching
to group unit (defendant) covariates, the study found that while
EM reduced new criminal activity (NCA) across all demographics,
the decrease was the lowest for violent offenders [5]. In addition,
electronic monitoring was found to reduce NCAmore than the use
of global-positioning system (GPS) monitoring.
The potential outcomes model offers several structural advan-
tages over regression-based methods for evaluating which inter-
ventions work in the criminal justice system [30]. First, one is able
to measure the impact of timing and duration of the applied in-
tervention in a causal inference framework, an advantage severely
lacking in regression-based methods. For example, given the lim-
ited resources for behavioral therapy in correctional settings, re-
search has shown that the timing of the initiation of behavioral
therapy has an effect not only on prison conduct of defendants,
but also on the risk of recidivism. In the potential outcomes frame-
work, a randomized experiment can test when it might be a good
time to initiate behavioral therapy as an intervention [19].
Second, random assignment of units to treatments ensures a “bal-
ance” of the covariates, thereby isolating the applied treatment as
the causal driver (or not). Third, causal inference insists that the
analyst carefully separates covariates that are not impacted by the
treatment from intermediate outcomes that are indeed impacted by
the treatment. This has serious implications for using risk assess-
ments as a diagnostic tool, especially for high-risk groups whose
risk stems from structural inequality.
This doesn’t mean that there is no room for machine learning
in the development of diagnostic risk assessments. Unsupervised
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and semi-supervised machine learning algorithms are well suited
for surfacing important causal questions regarding highly correla-
tional covariates. Such causal inference questions are much better
addressed by either performing inference on observational data,
or even better, the design of a randomized experiment when pos-
sible. For example, Kim and Duwe show [20] how supervised ma-
chine learning models outperform classical regression models for
predicting recidivism. Yet, these models are difficult to interpret,
even though they yield more accurate predictions. Rather than us-
ing machine learning for prediction, these methods could be used
to identify features that are highly predictive of recidivism, in or-
der to inform hypotheses on interventions (and their timing) that
can then be tested using causal inference.
6 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In recent times, predictive risk assessments have garnered unprece-
dented interest, as individuals from across the political spectrum
seek to achieve a diverse set of criminal justice reforms with the
help of data-driven actuarial tools. The promise of these tools is fre-
quently characterized in terms of the affordances they offer with
regard to cutting-edge technological advances in predictive data
analysis, in fields such as machine learning. Risk assessments have
been sold as an innovative means of achieving efficiency, neutral-
ity, and fairness in a system that has been plagued by the implicit
bias of individual decision makers (i.e. judges) and flawed organi-
zational risk mitigation practices (i.e. money-bail) [43].
However, the reality is that most risk assessments in use today
are built using statistical methods that are based on regression. Lit-
tle has changed since the 1970’s when the first statistically vali-
dated actuarial tools were built using regression algorithms. Even
in instances where new methods commonly associated with “arti-
ficial intelligence” are being developed for risk assessments, these
innovations are really incremental extensions of prior statistical
methods used for forecasting future criminal events.
Risk assessment has a long and rich history in the criminal jus-
tice system. Yet, in current debates surrounding the ethical use
of these tools, this larger historical context is often lost. Fairness
debates surrounding risk assessment end up in conceptual cul-de-
sacs, whereby trade-offs regarding things like “accuracy equity”
and “predictive parity” are weighed in lieu of asking deeper ques-
tions about what the purpose of these tools is and should be in
the first place [26, 29, 48]. Those deeper questions include asking
how actuarial tools might support or undermine crime prevention
interventions.
We argue thatwhen risk assessments are used primarily as a pre-
dictive technology, they fuel harmful trends towardsmass incarcer-
ation and growing inequality in the justice system. Predictive risk
assessments offer little guidance on how to effectively intervene to
lower risk. When predictive accuracy is the primary metric along
which these technologies are evaluated, the system misses oppor-
tunities to explore a deeper set of questions surrounding the way
its administrators can use data as part of a reflexive practice of
testing hypotheses in the service of achieving near and long term
goals.
We argue for a shift away from predictive technologies, towards
diagnostic methods that will help us to understand the crimino-
genic effects of the criminal justice system itself, as well as evalu-
ate the effectiveness of interventions designed to interrupt cycles
of crime. In contrast to the current emphasis on machine learning
techniques that offer no grounded way of understanding the un-
derlying drivers of crime, these methods should be based in a more
rigorous approach that incorporates both qualitative and quantita-
tive data analysis.
To this end, we argue that risk assessments should be conceived
of as a diagnostic tool that can be used to understand the underly-
ing social, economic and psychological drivers of crime. We posit
that causal inference offers the best framework for pursuing these
goals. More work should be done to examine how these quantita-
tive methods might be supplemented by more qualitative practices
of knowledge production. For example, Paluck argues that ethno-
graphic methods can enable researchers to move beyond average
treatment effects, to more deeply understand the underlying mech-
anisms of a causal effect via causal inference [54]. Moreover, El-
ish and boyd have pointed out that quantitative researchers would
benefit immensely from the rich frameworks for reflexivity found
in more qualitative data practices, such as ethnography [22]. This
is of paramount importance for data applications in the criminal
justice system, where researchers should constantly re-examine
the way their research practices might influence and warp the out-
comes of their work.
Though causal inference through randomized experiments has
been touted as the gold standard for evaluating criminogenic inter-
ventions, their practical application is much more sparse [31, 71].
A large scale survey of intervention evaluations in the US criminal
justice system found that only 16% of all interventions were evalu-
ated using randomized experiments [61]. Randomized experiments
to infer causal relationships between interventions and recidivism
are seen as difficult to implement in practice, given resource con-
straints in correctional facilities. Others have raised ethical chal-
lenges around subjecting a vulnerable population to a control arm
of a randomized experiment [71]. These concerns and challenges
mirror challenges inmedical research, where the testing ofmedical
devices, drugs and therapies can often have life and death implica-
tions. Yet, there are well-established and mature frameworks on
ethical experimentation and causal inference in clinical medicine.
It is inconceivable today to imagine the introduction of a new drug
without RCTs – the Food and Drug Administration mandates a
framework for furnishing evidence of a new drug’s effectiveness
in four phases. Guidelines and rules for ethical experimentation
on patients from funding bodies such as the National Institutes of
Health, combined with Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight
at host institutions are the norm for causal inference in medical
research. Scholars such as Greiner [31] have cast the lack of causal
inference in the law as a problem of political will.
In the criminal justice system, many new interventions, such as
the timing, type and doses of psychological therapy both within
and outside of correctional facilities can be tested using random-
ized experiments. In cases where a randomized experiment is ei-
ther not feasible or is ethically fraught with serious potential risks,
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deriving causal inference from observational data should be con-
sidered [30]. There is a growing body of work that deploys obser-
vational methods in the field of criminal justice. For instance, Dob-
bie, Goldin and Yang show via quasi-experimental observational
study design that pretrial detention weakens defendant’s bargain-
ing position in plea negotiations and a conviction also reduces their
future participation in the the formal labor market [18]. Just in
the last year, four other observational causal inference studies ex-
ploring the downstream consequences of pretrial detention were
released [32, 41, 49, 66].
In addition, Lum and Yang [50] have highlighted structural chal-
lenges that also hamper the use of causal inference studies, such
as the lack of early mentorship available for empirical criminology
analysts interested in using these methods, as well as a shift of
research funding away from randomized experiments to quick sta-
tistical analysis. The relative ease with which most regression and
supervised prediction algorithms can be estimated makes them all
the more convenient to use. It’s no surprise that machine learn-
ing has gained momentum over causal inference, at a time when
convenience is combined with the growing hype around the use of
machine learning to solve some of ourmost intractable social prob-
lems. Nevertheless, careful design of a causal inference setup, both
experimental and observational, offer significant benefits for the
process of discovering and validating criminogenic interventions.
Data-driven tools provide an immense opportunity for us to pur-
sue goals of fair punishment and future crime prevention. But this
requires us to move away from merely tacking on intervenable
variables to risk covariates for predictive models, and towards the
use of empirically-grounded tools to help understand and respond
to the underlying drivers of crime, both individually and systemi-
cally.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research leading to these results has received funding from the
Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence Fund.
REFERENCES
[1] D.A. Andrews and J. Bonta. 2010. The Psychology of Criminal Conduct. Lexis
Nexis/Anderson Pub.
[2] D. A. Andrews, James Bonta, and R. D. Hoge. 1990. Classification for Ef-
fective Rehabilitation. Criminal Justice and Behavior 17, 1 (1990), 19–52.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854890017001004
[3] D. A. Andrews, James Bonta, and J. Stephen Wormith. 2006. The Recent Past
and Near Future of Risk and/or Need Assessment. Crime & Delinquency 52, 1
(2006), 7–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128705281756
[4] Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner. 2016. Machine
Bias: There’s software used across the country to predict future criminals. And
it’s biased against blacks. ProPublica (2016).
[5] William Bales, KarenMann, Thomas Blomberg, Gerry Gaes, Kelle Barrick, Karla
Dhungana, and Brian McManus. 2010. Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment
of Electronic Monitoring. (2010).
[6] Geoffrey C Barnes, Lindsay Ahlman, Charlotte Gill, LawrenceW Sherman, Ellen
Kurtz, and Robert Malvestuto. 2010. Low-intensity community supervision for
low-risk offenders: a randomized, controlled trial. Journal of Experimental Crim-
inology 6, 2 (2010), 159–189.
[7] Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst. 2016. Big Data’s Disparate Impact. Cali-
fornia Law Review 104 (2016). Issue 3. https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38BG31
[8] Ulrich Beck. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. SAGE Publications
Ltd. 272 pages.
[9] J. Belknap. 2014. The Invisible Woman: Gender, Crime, and Justice. Cengage
Learning.
[10] Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns, and Aaron Roth.
2017. Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art. Work-
ing Paper 2017-1.0. University of Pennsylvania, Department of Criminology.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09207
[11] John Biggs. 2016. Naborly lets landlords screen tenants automagically. (2016).
https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/15/naborly-lets-landlords-screen-tenants-automagically/
[12] Meda Chesney-Lind. 1989. Girls’ Crime and Woman’s Place: Toward a Fem-
inist Model of Female Delinquency. Crime & Delinquency 35, 1 (1989), 5–29.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128789035001002
[13] Danielle Citron. 2016. (Un)Fairness of Risk Scores in Criminal Sentencing. (2016).
https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2016/07/13/unfairness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/
[14] Francis T. Cullen and Paul Genderau. 2001. FromNothingWorks toWhatWorks:
Changing Professional Ideology in the 21st Century. The Prison Journal 81, 3
(2001), 313–338. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032885501081003002
[15] Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson, and Daniel S. Nagin. 2011. Pris-
ons Do Not Reduce Recidivism. The Prison Journal 91, 3 (2011), 48S–65S.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032885511415224
[16] Robert DeFina and Lance Hannon. 2010. For incapacitation, there is no
time like the present: The lagged effects of prisoner reentry on property
and violent crime rates. Social Science Research 39, 6 (2010), 1004–1014.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.08.001
[17] Sarah L. Desmarais and Jay P. Singh. 2013. Risk Assessment Instruments Validated
and Implemented in Correctional Settings in the United States. Technical Report.
The Council of State Governments Justice Center.
[18] Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, and Crystal Yang. 2016. The effects of pre-trial de-
tention on conviction, future crime, and employment: Evidence from randomly as-
signed judges. Technical Report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
[19] Grant Duwe. 2017. Timing and Sequence of Correctional Programming. (2017).
http://www.crj.org/assets/2017/09/Timing-and-Sequencing-of-Correctional-Programming-Duwe.pdf
[20] Grant Duwe and KiDeuk Kim. 2016. Sacrificing Accuracy for Trans-
parency in Recidivism Risk Assessment: The Impact of Classification
Method on Predictive Performance. Corrections 1, 3 (2016), 155–176.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23774657.2016.1178083
[21] The Economist. 2017. Machine-learning promises
to shake up large swathes of finance. (2017).
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21722685-fields-trading-credit-assessment-fraud-prevention-machine-learning
[22] M. C. Elish and danah boyd. 2017. Situating methods in the magic
of Big Data and AI. Communication Monographs 0, 0 (2017), 1–24.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2017.1375130
[23] Margareth Etienne. 2009. Legal and practical implications of evidence-based
sentencing by judges. Chapman Journal of Criminal Justice 1 (2009), 43–60.
[24] Malcolm M. Feeley and Jonathan Simon. 1992. The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications. Criminology 30 (1992),
449–475. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/718/
[25] Stephen A. Fennell and William N. Hall. 1980. Due Process at Sentencing: An
Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal
Courts. Harvard Law Review 93, 8 (1980), 1613–1697.
[26] Anthony W. Flores, Kristin Bechtel, and Christopher T. Lowenkamp. 2016. False
Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to “Machine Bias:
There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future Criminals. And
It’s Biased Against Blacks.”. Federal Probation Journal (September 2016), 38–46.
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/publications/federal-probation-journal/federal-probation-journal-september-2016
[27] Arnold Foundation. 2016. Results from the First Six Months of the Public Safety
AssessmentâĂŞCourt in Kentucky. Report (2016).
[28] Andrew Gelman. 2007. Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical
models. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge New York.
[29] Abe Gong. 2016. Ethics for powerful algorithms (2 of 4). (July 2016).
https://medium.com/@AbeGong/ethics-for-powerful-algorithms-2-of-3-5bf750ce4c54
[30] D. James Greiner. 2008. Causal Inference In Civil Rights Litigation. Harvard Law
Review 122, 2 (2008), 533–598.
[31] D James Greiner and Andrea Matthews. 2016. Randomized control trials in the
United States legal profession. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 12 (2016),
295–312.
[32] Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, and Ethan Frenchman. 2016. The heavy
costs of high bail: Evidence from judge randomization. The Journal of Legal
Studies 45, 2 (2016), 471–505.
[33] Melissa Hamilton. 2015. Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal History
on Risk Assessment. Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law (2015). Forthcoming;
SSRN ID: 2555878.
[34] Kelly Hannah-Moffat. 2005. Criminogenic needs and the transformative risk
subject: Hybridizations of risk/need in penality. Punishment & Society 7, 1 (2005),
29–51.
[35] Kelly Hannah-Moffat. 2011. Sacrosanct or Flawed: Risk, Accountability and
Gender-responsive Penal Politics. Current Issues in Criminal Justice 22 (March
2011), 193–215. Issue 3.
[36] Kelly Hannah-Moffat. 2013. Actuarial Sentencing: An “Un-
settled” Proposition. Justice Quarterly 30, 2 (2013), 270–296.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2012.682603
[37] Kelly Hannah-Moffat. 2015. The Uncertainties of Risk Assessment: Partiality,
Transparency, and Just Decisions. Federal Sentencing Reporter 27, 4 (April 2015),
244–247. https://doi.org/10.1525/fsr.2015.27.4.244
Interventions over Predictions:
Reframing the Ethical Debate for Actuarial Risk Assessment FAT* 2018, February 2018, New York, NY USA
[38] Bernard E Harcourt. 2010. Risk as a proxy for race. (2010).
[39] Bernard E. Harcourt. 2015. Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of
Risk Assessment. Federal Sentencing Reporter 27, 4 (April 2015), 237–243.
https://doi.org/10.1525/fsr.2015.27.4.237
[40] Mark Hardy. 2014. Practitioner perspectives on risk: Using governmentality to
understand contemporary probation practice. European Journal of Criminology
11, 3 (2014), 303–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370813495758
[41] Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, and Megan Stevenson. 2017. The downstream
consequences of misdemeanor pretrial detention. Stan. L. Rev. 69 (2017), 711.
[42] Guido Imbens. 2015. Causal inference for statistics, social, and biomedical sciences
: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, New York.
[43] Pretrial Justice Institute. 2017. Pretrial Risk Assessments Can Produce Race-
Neutral Results. Report (2017).
[44] Gareth James. 2013. An introduction to statistical learning : with applications in
R. Springer, New York, NY.
[45] Rob Kitchin. 2014. Big Data, new epistemologies and paradigm shifts. Big Data&
Society 1, 1 (2014), 2053951714528481. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714528481
[46] Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig, and Sendhil
Mullainathan. 2017. Human Decisions and Machine Predictions. Working Paper
23180. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w23180
[47] Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Ziad Obermeyer. 2015.
Prediction Policy Problems. American Economic Review 105, 5 (May 2015), 491–
95. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151023
[48] Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Manish Raghavan. 2017. Inherent
Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores. In Proceedings of the 8th
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS ’17).
[49] Emily Leslie and Nolan G Pope. 2016. The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Deten-
tion on Case Outcomes: Evidence from NYC Arraignments. (2016).
[50] Cynthia Lum and Sue-Ming Yang. 2005. Why do evaluation researchers in crime
and justice choose non-experimental methods? Journal of Experimental Crimi-
nology 1, 2 (2005), 191–213.
[51] Paula Maurutto and Kelly Hannah-Moffat. 2006. Assembling Risk and the Re-
structuring of Penal Control. The British Journal of Criminology 46, 3 (2006),
438–454. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azi073
[52] Ojmarrh Mitchell, Joshua C. Cochran, Daniel P. Mears, and William D. Bales.
2017. Examining Prison Effects on Recidivism: A Regression Discontinuity Ap-
proach. Justice Quarterly 34, 4 (2017), 571–596.
[53] John Monahan and Jennifer L. Skeem. 2016. Risk Assessment in Crimi-
nal Sentencing. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology 12, 1 (2016), 489–513.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-021815-092945
[54] Elizabeth Levy Paluck. 2010. The Promising Integration of Qualitative Methods
and Field Experiments. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 628 (2010), 59–71.
[55] Seth J Prins and Adam Reich. 2017. Canwe avoid reductionism in risk reduction?
Theoretical Criminology (2017), 1362480617707948.
[56] Michael D. Reisig, Kristy Holtfreter, and Merry Morash. 2006. Assessing Re-
cidivism Risk Across Female Pathways to Crime. Justice Quarterly 23, 3 (2006),
384–405. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418820600869152
[57] Roggensack, C.J. and Abrahamson, J. 2016. State
of Wisconsin v. Eric L. Loomis. (July 2016).
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=171690
[58] Donald B Rubin. 2006. Matched sampling for causal effects. CambridgeUniversity
Press.
[59] Traci Schlesinger. 2011. The Failure of Race Neutral Policies: How
Mandatory Terms and Sentencing Enhancements Contribute to Mass
Racialized Incarceration. Crime & Delinquency 57, 1 (2011), 56–81.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128708323629
[60] Andrew D. Selbst. 2016. Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing. Georgia Law
Review (2016). Forthcoming; SSRN ID: 2819182.
[61] Lawrence Sherman. 2006. Evidence-based crime prevention. Routledge, London
New York.
[62] Sally S. Simpson. 1989. Feminist Theory, Crime, and Justice. Criminology 27, 4
(1989), 605–632. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb01048.x
[63] Bill Siwicki. 2017. Machine learning 101: The
healthcare opportunities are endless. (2017).
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/machine-learning-101-healthcare-opportunities-are-endless
[64] Jennifer L. Skeem, JohnMonahan, and Christopher T. Lowenkamp. 2016. Gender,
Risk Assessment, and Sanctioning: The Cost of TreatingWomen Like Men. Working
Paper 10. Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series.
[65] Sonja B. Starr. 2014. Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationaliza-
tion of Discrimination. Stanford Law Review 66 (2014). Issue 4.
[66] Megan Stevenson. 2016. Distortion of justice: How the inability to pay bail af-
fects case outcomes. (2016).
[67] Jason Tashea. 2017. Courts are using AI to sen-
tence criminals. That must stop now. (2017).
https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/
[68] Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve and LaurenMayes. [n. d.]. Criminal Justice Through
“Colorblind” Lenses: A Call to Examine the Mutual Constitution of Race and
Criminal Justice. Law & Social Inquiry 40, 2 ([n. d.]).
[69] Alfredo Vellido, José Martín-Guerrero, and Paulo J.G. Lisboa. 2012. Making ma-
chine learning models interpretable. 12 (01 2012), 163–172.
[70] Tammy Wang. 2017. How Machine Learn-
ing Will Shape the Future of Hiring. (2017).
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-machine-learning-shape-future-hiring-tammy-wang
[71] David Weisburd. 2000. Randomized experiments in criminal justice policy:
Prospects and problems. NCCD news 46, 2 (2000), 181–193.
[72] Rebecca Wexler. 2017. Code of Sielnce: How private com-
panies hide flaws in the software that governments use
to decide who goes to prison and who gets out. (2017).
http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaugust-2017/code-of-silence/
[73] Jiaming Zeng, Berk Ustun, and Cynthia Rudin. 2017. Interpretable classification
models for recidivism prediction. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A
(Statistics in Society) 180, 3 (2017), 689–722. https://doi.org/10.1111/rssa.12227
[74] Franklin E. Zimring. 2006. The Great American Crime Decline. Oxford University
Press. 258 pages. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195181159.001.0001
